Yerbolat Dosbayev

ENG-101-402

Ms. Kelley

24 November 2003

Leader of Somalia.

“Expect no mercy from outsiders” – Somali saying (Afrax 236)

            The world learned a lot about Somalia in 1992-93, when humanitarian disaster struck the country and was first shown in the news. At that time, the United Nations launched humanitarian operations backed by the United Nations troops. But what was supposed to be a peaceful help turned out to be a war in the summer of 1993. October 1993 operation of special Delta forces against one of the warlords General Aidid meant to end the war but, in fact, brought the chances for peaceful outcome of the conflict to nothing. Since then, many books have been written about it with the analysis of what was done wrong and how it should have been done. Hollywood made a movie about it, Black Hawk Down. As time passes by, many sources provide the public with stories about the events. The main idea is the movie’s preface: “An elite group of American Rangers and Delta Force soldiers are sent to Somalia on a critical mission to capture a violent warlord whose corrupt regime has lead to starvation of hundreds of thousands of Somalis. When the mission goes quickly and terribly wrong, the men find themselves outnumbered and literally fighting for their lives” (Black Hawk Down). How the general public accepts this view is reflected in one of the movie reviews: “The true story of an elite group of U.S. soldiers whose peacekeeping mission to Somalia turns deadly when hostile civilians mount an unexpected attack” (Hollywood Media Corp.) It is hard to evaluate single event or a person without knowing the background of the story. Even then, opinions depend on the point of view and may vary. However, this thorough review shows that Aidid was a person who truly knew and did what was best for the people of Somalia. He was the one who shared and represented the view of the majority of people of Somalia that real independence cannot be built by external powers.

The history of Somalis can be traced as far back as to X-XV centuries, to the introduction of Islam and nomadic pastoralism. The combination of both helped create the new culture for then indigenous and disconnected people of Horn of Africa. Its climate was very similar to that of the Arab peninsula and so best economical practices perfected by Arabs were very beneficial for aborigines of what is now called Somalia. New culture improved both mobility and economic efficiency of people. “At the same time, taking up Islam gave them a non-material claim to the prestige and worth of belonging to a world religion” (Ehret 251). As coastal trade moved farther into desert inlands, it strengthened the ties between regions and between the coastal towns and inland and it naturally helped structure the society. This period of steady development ended with the disintegration of Islamic civilization and the arrival of first Europeans in XVI-XVII centuries.

Since then, the country had become a plaything of the world politics. During XIX and the first half of XX century, several countries including France, Britain, Italy, Egypt and Ethiopia controlled Somali territories. The competition increased with the opening of Suez Canal in 1869, which made coastal towns strategically important. This competition divided the nation into parts because the colonialists did not pay much attention to exact shapes of the desert inland borders. When neighboring Kenya and Djibouti became independent, many Somalis found themselves living in those new states. In the case of Ethiopia-Somalia conflict over Odagen desert region, nomadic Somali pastoralists used to move out of that region to escape drought and then used to move back in again when drought ceased. However, the artificial borders made such migration difficult. This time bomb left by the colonialists exploded as new countries became independent. “Even before the upsurge of chaos in 1991 and 1992, more than 350,000 Somalis, 780,000 Ethiopians, and 700,000 Sudanese were refugees” (Lyons 190).

With the end of World War II, defeated empires gave way to the winners and, unlike most of the other African states, Somalia found itself independent in 1960 without much pain (Nelson 3). The post-war Western sector in Europe included Italy and Britain and so it was only natural that Somalia would turn into American hands. Liberation brought a new system of multiparty parliamentary democracy, which proved inapplicable in the clan-based Somali society after several years. Inexperienced and inefficient bureaucracy became corrupted, nepotism and cronyism flourished. The government faced many other problems difficult to overcome. The main problem was achieving unity for all Somali people, including those living in neighboring states. This goal was supported by all the citizens and was even written in the constitution. To accomplish that, the country needed extensive military support and that is why, when the United States denied the support for a large army, the government turned to the Soviet Union for help. With the Soviet equipment and training, the army had become the most organized and strongest institution in the state by 1969. On October 21, 1969, the parliamentary government was overthrown by a group of officers led by Siad Barre and the country turned into so-called scientific socialism, which was the doctrine of USSR adapted to Somalia’s situation. In 1969-77, the injection of socialism brought new changes into Somali society. Some were positive, such as mass literacy, but the quick and forced transformation of traditional society into a new one created more problems than resolved. One of the biggest problems was that the country became dependent on foreign aid. In 1977, Siad Barre started realizing the dream of Greater Somalia and occupied Odagen, the Ethiopia’s region with Somali population. Soviet Union saw this move as a threat and did not welcome the offensive just because Soviet Union itself was a multinational country with inaccurate internal borders. Hence, Soviet Union switched sides and helped Ethiopia defeat Somalis in 1980. This defeat flooded the country with nearly 1 million of refugees. The regime of Siad Barre, first meant to bring unity for all Somalis, home and abroad, was doomed. Now it turned to the United States for help. The United States, having vital interests in Persian Gulf area, provided very limited help, just enough to stabilize the situation in the country and maintain the regime of Barre. However, as Barre’s regime worsened, this task became harder. “During the years 1980-89 international aid reached a level of $4.268 billion in cash… First, the aid given fostered the dictatorial regime, endowing it with a new life. Secondly, it created a dependency on imported foodstuff, discouraging local food production. Last, but not the least, aid made thieves of nearly all the state employees, whose salaries were not enough to support their families even for a week” (Mansur 115). This all naturally led to the disaster of 88-91 when Barre’s regime could no longer control the country.

With the peace agreement with Ethiopia signed in April 1988, the focus of Somali politics shifted to internal issues and the United States felt that military and financial support was no longer necessary. The United States also started charging the regime with violations of human rights. The Cold War nearly ended and Somalia lost its strategic importance to the United States. In 1989-90, the situation in Somalia worsened more and the United States radically reduced its presence in Somalia (Rawson 170-176). “With the general curtailing of international economic aid, Siad Barre found it difficult to maintain his large army…” (Ghalib 200). Very soon the struggle against Barre’s regime’s genocide at North completely got out of control and turned into a full-scale civil war involving more and more people.

In early 1988, the elders of the Hawiye clan, which was the largest in Mogadishu, the backbone of the city’s business community, decided to take part of the anti-regime struggle. They invited Mohamed Farah Aidid who was then Somali Ambassador to India, Sri Lanka and Singapore to come back and organize armed opposition against Siad Barre. Aidid agreed. He was elected Chairman of United Somali Congress some time later. USC was the Southern faction opposing Barre, Somali National Movement (SNM) was fighting against Barre in the North while Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) consisting of former Ogaden refugees fought in the West. These factions fought together to overthrow Barre’s regime and all three of them supported Aidid, the war leader of USC (Ghalib 193-196). The leaders of the factions often met to decide strategies and to find common grounds. On one of the meetings they “established a pattern of opposition to external intervention that Aidid maintained until his death by a stray bullet in Mogadishu in August 1996” (Clarke 7). Indeed, any external help, even food, could potentially be a powerful tool serving someone’s interests to manipulate the country’s future. It proved to be a true prediction when Aidid detected that one of the United Nations planes had been carrying new Somali currency for distribution in the area of influence of his rival Mahdi (Drysdale 123).

During the last year of Barre’s rule, 1990, Mogadishu became home for many gangs, most of which, in fact, were former Barre’s soldiers and policemen. The regime spoiled them and taught them to murder and loot. The gangs became highly organized and targeted businesses of prominent Hawiye clansmen. The clashes developed into the final phase of the civil war when Aidid’s forces entered the city. On January 26, 1991, Siad Barre fled the city and all his former soldiers and policemen immediately joined the USC forces (Ghalib 210-211).

Right after Barre’s defeat, USC faction installed almost unknown Ali Mahdi who declared himself president without consulting other warring factions. This was a great disappointment especially for SNM, who had been fighting against Barre for several years at North. This also might have led to the separation of the North. The decision to appoint Ali Mahdi was made more shocking by the fact that, during the ceremony, he was flanked by some of the closest lieutenants of Siad Barre, including his second vice-president and the former minister of finance. This group has almost immediately started retaliations against Barre’s clansmen thus undermining both unity and credibility of USC. Because of all that, SPM faction, a former USC’s ally, declared a war on the USC. Aidid had no choice but to defeat Mahdi’s forces. It led to a new bloodletting war in Mogadishu in 1991-92 (Samatar 121-127).

In August 1992, Aidid, the leader of USC faction, still hoped for unity and formed Somali National Alliance, which included most of the Southern militia groups (Makinda 32). On the other hand, Mahdi was consolidating his own forces, which still included former Barre’s soldiers.

In the meantime, new serious drought occurred in the winter of 1990-91 (Wisner 36) but, because of heavy fighting in Mogadishu, the world did not know much about it. The United States returned with a large military force to secure humanitarian help to Somali people only in late 1992, when the world had first seen pictures about starvation. According to the rules, the United Nations could not deploy forces without consent of local government. In this case, two warlords in the South and Somali National Movement in the North represented the government. It took the United Nations long time before they could get permission to deploy forces to secure humanitarian help. Aidid highly opposed the United Nations’ intention to recognize Mahdi as a legitimate president. He also thought that Mahdi’s forces would grow with the help from the United Nations. Establishing Mahdi as a new president would undermine the long struggle against Barre’s regime and the very idea of reunification of all opposition forces.

In the summer of 1993, after the UNITAF forces had successfully resolved the problem of famine, Aidid had to confront the presence of the United Nations forces whose mission now switched to disarmament of the warlords and to political reconciliation. Since the United Nations failed to help create a solid, stable state early in 60s, its further efforts, now supported by troops, were highly opposed by the majority of Somali people. In June 1993, Aidid’s militia killed 23 Pakistani soldiers who were trying to inspect Aidid’s arms depot. The following day the United Nations forces started heavy bombardment of Aidid’s military facilities killing many civilians. By doing this, the United Nations antagonized many Somalis and made Aidid more popular as a hero (Makinda 80-81). The peace enforcement turned out to be a war on Aidid and many Somalis were killed. The conflict escalated further and, in September 1993, Egal, who was the president of Northern Somalia and a former brother in arms of Aidid, asked the United Nations to depart. According to the United Nations regulations, all the forces had to leave (Samatar 128).

That is when the events turned unpredictable way. Clinton’s administration could not stand being evicted from Somalia and ordered death warrant for Aidid. After the successful the UNITAF humanitarian operation in December 1992, the failure of a new peacemaking effort was not acceptable by new administration. The only obstacle was implacable Aidid with his staunch militia and that is why the United States dispatched special Delta forces to capture or kill Aidid. The United Nations forces were not aware of this operation. Had it succeeded, the operation could have gained formal permission for further reconciliation of peace in Somalia but, most probably, it would have waged an even fiercer fight between Aidid’s and Mahdi’s supporters. When the operation failed, the United Nations troops from other countries started questioning U.S. leadership in the operation and then gradually but quickly withdrew.

“From Aideed’s perspective, the United Nations had invaded Somalia, had sought by innumerable actions to diminish his stature and power, and in June had declared war on him; another battle to death followed, and the United Nations – with the United States finally sounding retreat – lost the war. From October 3 [1993] on, there was no ‘the United Nations solution’ realistically available for Somalia” (Woods 169). At last, the country was left alone with its problems.

The history of Somalia shows that external ‘help’ only created new problems and made the country dependent. That is why Aidid opposed any humanitarian or military intervention. Aidid was one of the few who understood the importance of real independence and self-determination because, throughout the history of so many years, all external interventions proved harmful or at least useless. In fact, the ‘help’ of the western countries in 60s made Somali society corrupted and provided grounds for the following military coup d'etat. Then the Soviets ‘helped’ undermine cultural and economic traditions of Somali people, propagating socialism. USSR also ‘helped’ flood the country with arms. Then Western countries again supported the vicious dictatorship of Barre providing him with money. The following collapse of the state led most Somalis to loose hope and trust in any outsiders. The country had chosen to be its own true master.

The history of social development takes a spiral path, with different countries having different positions on it – steady development or steep degradation. Each country has its own different point of view and sees its position as the only one right and all the others’ wrong. Let us suppose someone would interfere with the Civil War in the United States in 1860s and try to seek peaceful reconciliation? Or try to kill Lincoln? Would the United States have become what it is now? Maybe some day General Aidid will be pictured not as a villain but as a hero of the war for independence in a new Somalia.

Works cited

Afrax, Maxamed D. “The mirror of culture: Somali dissolution seen through oral expression”. The Somali challenge: from catastrophe to renewal? Ed. Ahmed I. Samatar. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994.

Black Hawk Down. Director, Ridley Scott. Movie. Columbia pictures, 2001.

Clarke, Walter. “Failed visions and uncertain mandates in Somalia”. Learning from Somalia: the lessons of armed humanitarian intervention. Ed. Walter Clarke, Jeffrey Herbst. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997.

Drysdale, John. “Foreign military intervention in Somalia: The root cause of the shift from the United Nations peacekeeping to peacemaking and its consequences”. Learning from Somalia: the lessons of armed humanitarian intervention. Ed. Walter Clarke, Jeffrey Herbst. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997.

Ehret, Christopher. “The eastern horn of Africa, 1000 B.C. to 1400 A.D.: The historical roots”. The invention of Somalia. Ed. Ali Jimale Ahmed. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995.

Ghalib, Jama Mohamed. The cost of dictatorship: the Somali experience. New York, N.Y.: L. Barber, 1995.

Hollywood Media Corp. “Black Hawk Down”. Film review. 24 Nov. 2003 www.hollywood.com/movies/reviews/movie/1099436

Lyons, Terrence. “Crises on multiple levels, Somalia and the horn of Africa”. The Somali challenge: from catastrophe to renewal? Ed. Ahmed I. Samatar. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994.

Makinda, M. Samuel. Seeking peace from chaos: humanitarian intervention in Somalia Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1993.

Mansur, Abdalla Omar. “Contrary to a nation: the cancer of the Somali state”. The invention of Somalia. Ed. Ali Jimale Ahmed. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995.

Nelson, Harold D. Somalia, a country study. Ed. Harold D. Nelson. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, U.S. G.P.O., 1982.

Rawson, David. “Dealing with disintegration: U.S. assistance and the Somali state”. The Somali challenge: from catastrophe to renewal? Ed. Ahmed I. Samatar. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994.

Samatar, Ahmed I. “The curse of Allah: Civic disembowelment and the collapse of the state in Somalia”. The Somali challenge: from catastrophe to renewal? Ed. Ahmed I. Samatar. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994.

Wisner, Ben. “Jilaal, Gu, Hagaa, and Der: Living with the Somali land, and Living Well”. The Somali challenge: from catastrophe to renewal? Ed. Ahmed I. Samatar. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1994.

Woods, James L. “U.S. government decision-making processes during humanitarian operations in Somalia”. Learning from Somalia: the lessons of armed humanitarian intervention. Ed. Walter Clarke, Jeffrey Herbst. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997.